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738 PEOPLE fl. LA. MACCHIA [41 C.2d 
[So F. No. 18835. In Bank. Dec. 15,1953.] 
THE PEOPLE, Appellant, v. PASQUALE LA MACCHIA 
et at, Defendants; RALPH B. FILIOE et aI., Re-
spondents. 
[1] Witnesses-Cross-enmination-Scope and Extent.-The field 
of inquiry in cross-examination for purpose of testing credi-
bility and weight of testimony is so extensive that trial court 
must be given wide discretion to keep such examination within 
reasonable bonnds. 
[2] Id.-Cross-examination-Scope and Extent.-When appellate 
court is called on to decide whether discretionary power of 
trial court over cross-examination has been abused, inquiry is 
whether a sufficiently wide range has been allowed to t.:-st 
credibility and weight of testimony rather than whether some 
particular qnestion should have been allowed. 
[3] Eminent Domain-Evidence as to Damages-Value of Other 
Land.-Witnesses giving their opinions of valne of land being 
condemned cannot, on direct examination, testify as to par-
ticular transactions, such as sales of adjoining lands, how 
mnch has been offered and refused for adjoining land or for 
land in question, or how mnch the condemning party has been 
oompelled to pay in other and like oases, notwithstanding these 
transaction may constitute sonrce of their knowledge. 
[4] Evidence-Opinion Evidence-Examination of Witnesses.-
On cross-examination of a witness as to valne of land, evi-
dence of particular transactions, snch as sales of adjoining 
lands, is admissible for sole pnrpose of discrediting opinion 
of witness, but it may not be considered for purpose of fixing 
valne of land in dispute. 
[1] See Cal.Jar., Witnesses, § 76; Am.Jar., Witnesses, § 620 
et seq. 
[3] See CaLJur., Eminent Domain, § 68 et seq.; Am.Jur., Emi-
nent Domain, §§ 347, 351. 
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Witnesses, § 133; [2] Witnesses, 
§l34(1); [3, 8, 17] Eminent Domain, § 81; [4, 16] Evidence, 
§ 546; [5, 12] Evidenoe, § 530(3); [6, 1] Evidence, § 452; 
[9, 10] Evidence, § 530(1}; [11, 13, 141 Evidence, § 530(2); 
[15, 28, 31] Eminent Domain, §lS2; [18, 191 Evidence, § 551: 
[20] Witnesses, §l80; [21] Eminent Domain, § 69(9); [22J 
Eminent Domain, § 81; [23J Fnninent Domain, § 80; [24J Eminent 
Domain, § 88; [251 Eminent Domain, § 188; [261 Eminent Domain. 
1181(1) j [21J Eminent Domain, 1163; [29] Evidence, § 563; [30] 
Eminent Domain, § 69(3). . 
Dec. 1953] PEOPLE tI. LA MACCBU 
[.1 C.2d '738; 264 P.2d 15] 
739 
[5] Id.-Opinion Evidence-Value of Property.-One who has 
given his opinion as to value of certain property may, on 
direct examination, state reasons on which it rests, but the 
facts stated as reasons do not b.come evidence in sense that 
they have independent probative value on issue as to market 
value. 
[6] Id.-Opinion Evidence-Bases of Opinions.-Evidence of mat-
ters incompetent as substantive evidence may not be introduced 
for purpose of fortifying opinion of an expert witness, 
though offered under guise of reasons for his opinion, and 
though they might be admitted on cross-examination to test 
and diminish weight to be given his opinion. 
[7] ld. - Opinion Evidence - Bases of Opinions.-General rule 
which permits witness to state reasons on which his opinion 
is premised may not be used as a vehicle to bring before jury 
incompetent evidence. 
[8] Eminent Domain-Evidence as to Damages-Value ot Other 
Land.-On direct examination, a witness should not be allowed 
to go into details of particular offers for property being con-
demned or specific sales or transactions in connection with 
other property. 
(9] Evidence-Opinion Evidence-Value of Property.-All that is 
necessary to entitle a witness to give an opinion on subject 
of value is to show that he has some peculiar means of forming 
an intelligent and correct judgment as to value of property in 
question beyond what is presumed to be possessed by men 
generally. 
[10] Id.-Opinion Evidence-Value of Property.-The usual ex-
pert is qualified to give an opinion on value by showing his 
familiarity with property in question and with other property 
in neighborhood, his experience in the business, his familiarity 
with state of market and of sales of similar property in 
vicinity. 
[11] Id. - Opinion Evidence - Value of Property.-A property 
owner is generally considered competent to el!timate value of 
his property on a showing that he has resided thereon for a 
number of years. 
[12] Id.-Opinion Evidence-Value of Property.-Owner of land 
is entitled to state on direct examination the reasons for hi. 
opinion as to worth of his property, but those reasons can 
be no broader than those of any other witness qualified to state 
an opinion. 
[18] Id.-Opinion Evidence-Value of Property.-Ownership with 
residence on land for a reasonable time establishes owner's 
[9] See Cal.Jur., Evidence, § 277 et seq.; Am.Jur., Evidence, 
§ 891 et seq. 
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qualification to testify as to value of his property, but it does 
not extend scope of inquiry on direct examination; evidence 
of . an offer to purchase the property is nonetheless collateral 
and as productive of delay and confusion when brought bcfore 
jury by owner as it would be if presented by an expert on 
land values. 
U4] ld. - Opinion Evidence - Value of Property.-A property 
owner and an expert witness are in a different· position only 
insofar as their qualifications to testify rest on different bases, 
and in stating his opinion as to value of property the owner 
is bound by same rules of admissibility of evidence as is any 
other witness. 
[16] Eminent Domain-Proceedings-Appeal-Rarmless Error.-
Error in a condemnation proceeding in admitting evidence 
relating to an offer to purchase a portion of property of 
owners affected did not prejudice the state, where such offer 
constituted a small part of all evidence before jury on value 
of such property, and where it does not appear that mention 
of offer for only portion of land influenced verdict to any sub-
stantial extent. 
[16] Evidence-Opinion Evidence-Examination of Witnesses.-
Evidence of an offer to purchase property may properly be 
presented on cross-examination for purpose of testing weight 
to be accorded an opinion as to value. 
U7] Eminent Domain - Evidence as to Damages - Sales.-Al-
though generally a witness testifying as to value of property 
being condemned should not be allowed, on his examination 
in chief, to go into details of particular sales or transactions, 
the core of inadmissibility is the consideration, and where no 
price is mentioned the rule of inadmissibility does not apply. 
[18] Evidence-Opinion Evidence-Examination of Witnesses.-
The amount paid for other land may not be presented to jury 
on redirect examination in a condemnation cnse, where it is 
offered as independent proof of value. 
[19] ld.-Opinion Evidence-Examination of Witnesses.-FactorB 
going to weight to be accorded an expert opinion constitute 
"new matter" within meaning of Code Civ. Proc., § 2050, de· 
elaring that a witness once examined cannot be reexamined 
as to same matter without leave of court, but may be 1'&-
examined as to any new matter on which he has been examined 
by adverse party. 
[20] Witnesses-Reexamination.-On redirect examination, it is 
proper to permit a witness to state facts and circumstances 
tending to correct erroneous inferenees which may have been 
drawn from his testimony on cross-examination. 
[21] Eminent Domain-Estimation of Damages-Value of Prop-
ertJ Talten.-In determining market value of land being con-
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demned, the test is not its value for a special purpose, but 
fair market value of land in view of all purposes to which 
it is naturally adapted. 
[22) Id.-Evidence as to Damages-Value of Land 'luen.-In 
ascertaining value of real property being condemned, any evi-
dence which tends to show physical condition of property, the 
purpose fot· which it is employed, or any reasonable use for 
which it may be adal)ted, is competent. 
[is] Id.-Evidence as to Damages.-Evidence as to what owner 
intended to do with land being condemned cannot be con-
sidered in estimating the damages. 
[24] IeL-Evidence as to Damages-Prospective l1ses.-Under cer-
tain circumstances evidence that a proposed use of property 
being condemned would result in a profit is admissible, not 
for purpose of enhancing damages by showing loss to owner 
of particular plan of operation, but to show thatsueh proposed 
plan is feasible and should be considered in. fixing market 
value. 
[25} Id.-Proceedings-Appeal-Ha.rm1ess Error.-In a condem-
nation proceeding, any prejudice resulting from erroneous 
admission of evidence concerning owner's purposes with re-
gard to his property was, to a considerable extent, o1fset by 
other testimony similar in character which was received with-
out objection. 
[S6] Id.-Proceedings-Appeal-Presumptions.-on appeal from 
a judgment awarding damages to OWDers of property taken 
by eminent domain, it will be presumed that jury understood 
instrnctions which clearly and unambiguously Bet forth law 
with regard to future nse of property as distinct from its 
market value, and correctly applied such instrnCtiODB to the 
evidence. 
[27] IeL - Proceedings - InstructioDS.-In proceeding for con-
demnation of land for use as a freeway, instrnctions as a 
whole fairly Btated controlling principles concerning existing 
right of access to highway, although jurors might have been 
told that extent of easement of access may be said to be that 
which is l'easonably required giving eons~deration to all pur-
poses to which property is adapted, where they were told that 
only when condemnation destroys or subatantially impairs 
right of access is an owner entitled to compensation therefor. 
[28] Id.-Proceedings-ApPeal-Harmless and Reveralble Error. 
-An instrnction in a condemnation proceeding. that "Owners 
are presumed to know the value of their property, and being 
permitted under the law to testify thereto, their evidence in 
that regard is entitled to be weighed and considered by the 
jury" was not reversible error, ali~ough word "presumed" 
ahould not have been used, where the awarda were far below 
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values placed by owners on their respective properties, and 
where other instructions stated that final responsibility for 
determining amounts to be awarded rested with jurors, and 
that it was their duty to evaluate and weigh testimony of 
witnesses who stated their opinions as to values. 
[29] Evidence-Province to Determine Weight and Oredibility.-
Upon triers of fact rests responsibility to reconcile, if possible, 
any apparent conflict, whether the same arises on entire case 
or in testimony of a single witness, and to effectuate all 
evidence when nature of case will admit of such disposition. 
[SO] Eminent Domair.-Estimation of Damages-ValUe of Prop-
erty Taken.-Compensation for property taken by eminent 
domain is based on loss imposed on owner rather than on 
benefit received by taker, and beneficial purpose to be derived 
by condemnor's use of property is not to be taken into con-
sideration in determining market values, being wholly irrele-
vant. 
[31] Id.-Proceedings-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error. 
-In proceeding for condemnation of land for use as a free-
way, an erroneous instruction that, in ascertaining market 
value, the purpose for which property was being taken by the 
state could be considered was not reversible error, where jury 
was also told that although market value of property was 
to be determined with due consideration of all available uses, 
its special value to the state must be excluded as an element 
of market value, where there was no evidence in regard to 
value of use to the state for highway purposes, and where 
jury received usual instruction to award compensation "in 
accordance with the evidence in this case." 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa 
Clara County. Byrl R. Salsman. Judge. Affirmed. 
Proceeding for condemnation of land for use as a freeway. 
Judgment for defendants affirmed. 
Robert E. Reed, Holloway Jones, Jack M. Howard, Roger 
Anderson and Edward L. Doyle for Appellant. 
J. Oscar Goldstein, P. M.. Barceloux, Burton J. Goldstein, 
and Goldstein. Barceloux & Goldstein for Respondents. 
EDl\10NDS, J.-For the purpose of constructing a freeway, 
the state is condemning certain land bordering the presently 
existing highway, which is to be widened. Along each side 
of the freeway there will be a fence cutting off access to it 
except through 20-foot openings at certain points. 
) 
", 
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There are five parcels of land involved in the state's 
appeal from the judgment awarding damages to the owners. 
These parcels have a frontage on the present highway of from 
260 to 5,000 feet. On the land having the 5,OOO.foot frontage, 
there are to be three 20-foot openingl!l in the fence at con· 
venient points. One 20.foot opening is to be provided for 
each of the other parcels. The land to be taken for in-
clusion in the freeway ranges from less than one foot to 60 
feet in width. The area of four of the parcels varies from 
10 to 38 acres; the largest one has 1,245 acres. 
The experts called by the state and those who testified 
for the owners placed substantially the same values on the 
land taken. However, they varied markedly on severance 
damages. That was occasioned principally by a difference 
of opinion as to the highest and best use of the land along 
the highway, which was being used for agricultural purposes 
with the usual improvements relating to farming and fruit 
growing. The state's witnesses based their opinion as to 
the amount of severance damages primarily upon the loss of 
agricultural utility and loss of convenience of agricultural 
operations for 20 feet from the freeway fence, with certain 
allowances for rearrangements of existing improvements. The 
owners and their experts testified that at least a portion of the 
land presently is adaptable and suitable for commercial de· 
velopment but cannot be used for such purpose with the 
restricted access planned by the state. 
According to the state, the severance damages are grossly· 
excessive, and were allowed because, of errors in evidentiary 
rulings and the instructions. The property owners maintain 
that the rulings and instructions were correct, and in any 
event not prejudicial. 
One of the issues is whether the trial court erroneously 
and prejudicially curtailed the state's cross-examination of 
the property owners' witnesses. [1] "The field of inquiry 
in cross·examination for the purpose of testing the credibility 
of a witness and the weight of his testimony is so extensive 
that the trial court must be given wide discretion in order 
to keep such examination within reasonable bounds; other· 
wise the trial of cases would be overlong. [I] When an 
appellate court is called upon to decide whether such dis· 
cretion has been abused, the inquiry is whether a sufficiently 
wide range has been allowed to test sUch credibility and 
weight rather than whether some particular question should 
have been allowed." (EMf Bay it.n. Utilit" Din. T. 
./ 
) 
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Kieffer, 99 Cal.App. 240, 261 [278 P. 476, 279 P. 178].) 
The state is complaining of seven rulings in some 240 pages 
of the cross-examination of three experts. No useful purpose 
would be served by stating the specific questions which, it 
is claimed, should have been permitted, for each is peculiar 
to the circumstances of this case. The record shows that 
the state's objections are not well taken. The trial judge 
allowed wide . latitude in the cross-examination of the wit-
nesses, and in bringing certain lines of inqury to a close 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
The state's second contention is that the trial court erred 
in admitting evidence relating to an offer to purchase a por-
tion of the property owned by Ercole and Rafaella Pelliccione. 
Upen direct examination Ercole Pelliccione testified that he 
valued his property before the taking at $105,000. Asked 
the "reason for that opinion," he stated. "The reason is the 
frontage-it's almost 700 feet-I had on Monterey Road, that 
is all business property. The people, they asked me in 1947, 
they wanted to buy it." The state interposed an objection. 
upon the grounds of irrelevancy and incompetency, which 
the trial court overruled. Pelliccione continued: "In 1947 
I was contacted by some people, they wanted to buy one acre 
right there where the big oak tree was, to build a motel, and 
they offered me $7,000. . . ." 
This answer placed before the jury testimony which may 
not be elicited upon direct examination. [3] The long 
established rule in this state is that witnesses •• cannot, tlPon 
the direct examination, be allowed to testify as to particular 
transactions, such as sales of adjoining lands, how much has 
been offered and refused for adjoining lands of like quality 
and location, or for the land in question, or any part thereof, 
or how much the . . . [condemning party has] been com· 
pelled to pay in other and like cases-notwithstanding these 
transactions may constitute the source of their knowledge." 
(Central Pac. B. B. Co. v. Pearson, 35 Cal. 247, 262.) The 
courts have neither deviated nor retrea~d from this rule. 
(City of Los Angeles v. Hughes, 202 Cal. 781, 786 [262P. 
787]; Estate of Boss, 171 Cal. 64, 65-66 {lSI P. 1188]; 
Atchison, T. ~ 8. P. R; Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 13 Cal. 
App.2d 505, 512 [57 P.2d 575]; H'f,oernia 8a11. etc. Soc. v. 
Ellis Estate Co., 132 Cal.App. 408, 411 [22 P.2d 806]; City 
of Los Angeles v. Deacon. 119 Ca1.App. 491, 493-494 {7 P.2d 
878] ; Merchants' Trust Co. v. Hopkins, 103 Cal.App. 473, 
478-479 [284 P. 1072].) \ 
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In an early case this court pointed out that to allow evi-
dence of particular transactions to be presented on direct 
examination would open up each transaction as a side issue 
and the invesitgation would be rendered interminable. (Oen-
tral Pac. R. R. 00. v. Pearson, supra, at p. 262.) [4] Upon 
cross-examination, however, such evidence is admissible for 
. the sole purpose of discrediting the opinion of the witness 
(Oentral Pac. R. R. 00. v. Pearson, supra, at p. 262; Reclama-
tion Dist. No. 790 v. Inglin, 31 Cal.A.pp. 495, 500 [160 P. 
1098] ; Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Oorp. v. Etienne, 83Cal.App. 
645, 647 [257 P. 123]), but it may not be considered for the 
purpose of fixing the value of the land in dispute. (Estate 
of Ross, supra, at p. 66; ReeZamati(}n Dist. No. 790 v. IngZin. 
S1tpra, at p. 500.) 
The owners assert, however, that evidence of an offer to 
purchase the property desired by the state may be presented 
upon direct examination as a reason for the opinion of the 
witness. [6] It is clear that one who has given his opinion 
as to the value of certain property may, upon direct examina-
tion, state the reasons upon which it rests. (Long Beach Oity 
H. S. Dist. v. Stewart, 30 Ca1.2d 763, 773 [185 P.2d 585, 173 
A.L.R. 249].) But the· facts stated as reasons do not become 
evidence in the sense that they have independent probative 
value upon the issue as to market value. (TMrnton v. Birm-
ingham, 250 Ala. 651 [35 So.2d 545]; 32 C.J.S .• Evidence, 
§ 521, p. 219.) Instead, they serve only to reinforce the 
judgment of the witness, that is, they go to the weight to be 
accorded his opinion. (See Long Beach City B. S. Disi. v. 
Stewart, supra, at p. 773.) [6] As said in Peirson v. Bos-
ton EZ. R. 00., 191 Mass. 223 [77 N.E. 769] : " [T]here is no 
right to put in evidence of matters which are incompetent 
as substantive evidence for the purpose of fortifying" the 
opinion of an expert witness, even though they are offered 
under the guise of the reasons for his opinion, and even 
though they might properly have been' admitted on cross-
. examination to test and diminish the weight to be given to 
his opinion." (Pp. 233-234.) The rule is similarly ex-
pressed in United States v. 25.406 Acres of LaM, 172 F.2d 
990, 993, and Nichols states it in substantially the same 
language. (5 Nichols on Eminent Domain [3d ed.] § 18.45 
[1], p. 181.) 
[7] The general rule which permits a witness to state 
the reasons upon which his opinion is premised may not be 
used as a vehicle to bring before the jury incompetent evi-
/ 
) 
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dence. To so open up the inquiry would create a disastrous 
break in the dike which stands against a flood of interminable 
investigation. [8] Upon direct examination, a witness never 
should be allowed to go into the details of particular offers 
for the property being condemned or specific sales or trans-
actions in connection with other property. (Reclamation 
Dist. No. 730 v. Inglin, supra, at p. 500.) 
The property owners urge that a distinction must be 
made between a witness such as Pelliccione, who is an owner 
of one of the properties being taken by the state, and the 
witness who testifies as an expert. They argue that the scope 
of the direct examination of the expert is more limited 
than that of a property owner. However, there is no logical 
ground for any such distinction. [9] "All that is necessary 
to be shown to entitle a witness to give an opinion is to show 
'that he has some peculiar means of forming an intelligent 
and correct judgment as to the value of the property in ques-
tion ... beyond what is presumed to be possessed by men 
generally.''' (Spring Valley W. W. v. Drinkhouse, 92 Cal. 
528, 534 [28 P. 681].) [10] The usual expert is qualified 
by proof of his familiarity with the property and with other 
property in the neighborhood, his experience in the business, 
his familiarity with the state of the market and of sales of 
similar property in the vicinity. (Estate of Ross, supra, at 
pp. 66-67.) [11] A property owner, on the other hand, is 
generally considered competent to estimate the value of his 
property upon a showing that he has resided thereon for a 
number of years. (Long Beach City H. S. Dist. v. Stewart, 
supra, at p. 772; Spring Valley W. W. v. Drinkhouse, supra, 
at p. 534.) 
[12] The state did not challenge Pelliccione's competency, 
and he was entitled to state upon direct examination the 
reasons for his opinion as to the worth of his property. 
(Long Beach City H. S. Dist. v. Stewart, supra, at p. 773.) 
Those reasons could be no broader than those of any other 
witness qualified to stat~ an opinion. [13] Ownership with 
residence on the land for a reasonable time established his 
qualification to testify, but it did not extend the scope of' 
the inquiry upon direct examination. Evidence of an offer 
to purchase is nonetheless collateral, and as productive of 
delay and confusion, when it is brought before the jury by 
the owner as it would be if it were presented by an expert 
on land values. 
) 
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In Peirson v. Boston El. R. Co., supra, a property owner 
had been permitted to relate upon his direct examination 
the details of offers to purchase his property. It was held 
that the rule permitting a witness to state the reasons under· 
lying an opinion did not afford the owner a means for in· 
troducing otherwise incompetent evidence on the ultimai!:' 
question of value, and that the testimony relating to offers to 
purchase was therefore improperly admitted. [14] Clearly. 
therefore, a property owner and an expert witness are in a 
different position only insofar as their qualifications to testify 
rest upon different bases. In stating his opinion as to the 
value of property, the owner is bound by the samE rules 
of admissibility of evidence as is any other witness. 
Long Beach City H. S. Dist. v. Stewart, supra, does not 
hold to the contrary. In that ease, an objection was sustained 
to a question asking an owner upon what he based his opinion 
as to value. "[T] here is not the slightest indication in the 
record or in the briefs concerning the nature of the testi-
mony which appellant would have given in reply to the 
question" (p. 774). Under such circumstances it was de-
cided that he "should have been permitted to state the reasons 
for his opinion on market value." 
[15] Although the evidence now challenged was inad-
missible, the error did not prejudice the state. The offer to 
purchase constituted a small part of all the evidence before 
the jury on the value of Pelliccione's property (c/. Railway 
Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., supra, at p. 513), and from the 
record as a whole it does not appear that mention of the 
offer for only a portion of the land influenced the verdict to 
any substantial extent. (Cf. Reclamation Dist. No. 730 v. 
l'llglin, supra, at pp. 500-501.) 
Another asserted violation of the rule prohibiting evi-
dence as to offers to purchase occurred during the cross-
examination of the owners' witness Challen. A question of 
counsel for the state was, " [8] 0 do I understand that in your 
opinion this highway frontage on these parcels would be 
around seven, eight thousand dollars an acre if placed upon 
the open market for saleY" Challen replied, "I investigated 
one parcel here that I had heard an offer had been made on 
..• , as a matter of fact, Mr. Pelliccione was offered $7,000 
for 200 feet." In denying a motion to strike out the state-
ment upon the ground that it was not responsive, the court 
said, "[I]t's explanatory of his answer." 
148 PEOPLE v. LA MAccmA [41 C.2d 
[16] In its briefs the state challenges this testimony upon 
the sole ground that it violates the rule against the admission 
of offers to purchase. But the questioning was upon cross-
examination, and evidence of an offer may properly be pre-
sented at such time for the purpose of testing the weight to 
be accorded an opinion as to value. Under the circumstances 
shown by the record the trial court properly refused to strike 
the testimony. (Cf. Code Civ. Proc., § 2052.) 
Upon redirect examination of Challen, he was interrogated 
concerning thc offer as to the acreage and contemplated use 
of the property. Over objection upon the ground that the 
information was· incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, 
Challen stated that it was for an area about 200 by 200 feet 
to be used for a service station. That statement added little 
to the facts brought out on cross-examination. However, 
Challen also said that Pelliccione had been approached in 
negotiations for a motel site on the same property. Challen 
made no mention of the prices offered, but said that all of 
the owners had refused similar offers "even at the prices they 
were offered . . . because they wanted that free ingress and 
egress that they have had prior to the installation of that 
fence." 
[17] Although, as a general proposition, a witness upon 
his examination in chief should not be allowed to go into 
the details of particular sales or transactions (Reclamation 
Dist. No. 730 v. biglin, supra, at p. 500), the core of inad-
missibility is the consideration. (San Francisco v. Tillman 
Estate Co., 205 Cal. 651, 656 [272 P. 585] ; Estate of Ross, 
supra, at p. 67.) Where no price is mentioned, the rule laid 
down in Central Pac. R. R. Co. v. Pearson, supra, does not 
apply. (San Francisco v. Tillman Estate Co., supra, at pp. 
656·657.) 
Another contention is that evidence of the sales of other 
property was erroneously admitted. In cross-examination 
of two of the owners' expert witnesses, the state brought 
out the prices at which various other properties in the vicinity 
had been sold. Those prices were considerably lower than 
the values placed by each of the witnesses upon the land 
being condemned. Upon redirect examination, and over the 
state's objection, the witness was permitted to state the 
various facts which, in his opinion, tended to reconcile the 
prices paid for other land with the valuation he had given. 
Such inquiry, it is urgedJ should not have been allowed. 
) 
) 
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[18] The amount paid for other land may not be presented 
to the jury upon redirect examination where it is offered as 
independent proof of t"alue. (Reclamation Dist. No. 790 
v. lngUn, supra, at p. 500.) [19] However, section 2050 
of the Code of Civil Procedure provides, in part: "A witness 
once examined cannot be re-examined as to the same matter 
without leave of the court, but he may be re-examined as 
to any new matter upon which he has been examined by the 
adverse party. " Certainly, factors going to the weight to be 
accorded an expert opinion constitute "new matter" within 
the meaning of this statute.. [20] Also, upon general 
principles, it is proper to permit a witness to state facts and 
circumstances tending to correct erroneous inferences which 
may have been drawn from his testimony upon cross-exam-
ination. (Pedley v. Doyle, 177 Cal. 284 [170 P. 602] ; Myers 
v. Rose, 27 Ca1.App.2d 87, 89 [80 P.2d 527]; People v. 
Corey, 8 Ca1.App. 720, 725 [97 P. 907] ; 2 Wigmore on Evi-
dence [3d ed.] § 463, p. 512.) 
With one exception, the many cases cited by the state in 
support of its position do not state a contrary rule. Some 
of them concerned the propriety of such evidence upon direct 
examination (City of Los Angeles v. Hughes, supra, at p. 
736; Estate of Ross, supra, at pp. 65-66; HibeNilia Sa",; etc. 
Soc. v. Ellis Estate Co., supra, at p. 411; City of Los Angeles 
v. Deacon, supra); in another, the court was concerned with 
the question of whether there was competent evidence of the 
substantive inquiry as to value (MerchfJntsTrust Co. v. 
Hopkins, supra, at pp. 478-479). Dickey v. Dunn, 80 Cal.App. 
724, 728 [252 P. 770], and Thompson v. Stoakes, 46 Cal.App. 
2d 285, 292-293 [115 P.2d 830], concerned evidence of sale of 
the identical property in question, but in Bagdasarian v. 
Gragnon, 31 Cal.2d 744, 758 [192 P.2d 935], the Thompson 
case was expressly overruled on that point. 
In Reclam4tion DiBt. No. 790 v. Inglin, supr..a, it does not 
appear whether the redirect examination was properly limited 
to the specific sales brought out upon cross-examination. In 
any event, apparently it was argued on the appeal that such 
evidence was admissible for the purpose of fixing the value 
of the land in dispute, and was not correctly tendered for 
the sole purpose of explaining the factors surrounding the 
sales which tended to diminish the weight to be accorded 
the witness' opinion. In Palladine v. Imperial Valley F. L. 
Assn., 65 Cal.App. 727, 756 [225 P. 291], the testimony was 
elicited upon cross-examination and the question presented 
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was th~ propriety of refusing an instl'uction limiting the evi-
dence to the purpose of testing the witnesses' knowledge 
and discrediting their opinions. 
The single case apparently standing for the rule asserted 
by the state is Atchison, T. 4: S. F. R. 00. v. Southern Pac. 
Co., 13 Cal.App.2d 505 [57 P.2d 575]. In that decision the 
trial judge permitted an expert witness to testify upon re-
direct examination concerning the significant features of the 
sales of other properties which had been mentioned during 
the course of the cross-examination. In addition, the court 
had allowed "[ q] uestions as to whether or not property 
in the general locality of the property sought to be condemned 
had increased in value. . .. This class of questions included 
all property in the general locality in the case of some of the 
questions, and in the case of other questions involved only 
particular pieces of property in the locality." (P.511.) As 
to the questions which were outside the scope of the cross-
examination, it was properly held that the evidence was 
inadmissible. And upon the assumption that the field of in-
quiry was the same as upon direct examination, the court 
included as inadmissible the testimony as to specific sales 
which was given upon cross-examination. For these reasons 
the decision does not support the state's contention. 
Complaint is also made of the admission of certain evi-
dence relating to the purposes motivating the owners to pur-
chase their properties, and to plant certain crops. Such 
testimony, it is said, violates the principle that the true and 
only criterion of damages is market value, and not the value 
in use to the owner, either actual or prospective. 
Upon cross-examination of Challen, he volunteered informa-
tion that one of the owners "planted diversified fruit for the 
purpose of selling . . . retailing right from his property 
there. " A motion to strike was denied. Over objection 
that it was "incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial," owner 
Ernest Filice was permitted to testify upon direct examination 
that "the sole purpose" in purchasing the property was 
the location of the property on United States Highway 10l. 
Over the same objection he also was permitted to state that 
the main reason he purchased the property was ., on account 
of that frontage in front and with the good visibility we 
had in mind at some future date to take advantage of the 
uses, commercial uses . . . to erect some kind of a business 
on that frontage, whether either a gas station or a restaurant 
or fruit stand.' I Ercole Pelliccione, coowner of another par-
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eel, over objection, was allowed to state his intention to build 
a motel on his property, and that he planted two acres of 
cherries in order to sell them at retail to travelers on the 
highway. 
[a1] This court "has definitely aligned itself with the 
great majority of the courts in holding that damages must 
be measured by the market value of the land at the time 
it is taken, that the test is not the value for a special plirpose, 
but the fair market value of the land in view of all the 
purposes to which it is naturally adapted; that therefore 
while evidence that it is 'valuable' for this or that or another 
purpose may always be given and should be freely received, 
the value in terms of money, the price, which one or another 
witness may think the land would bring for this or that or 
the other specific purpose is not admissible as an element in 
determining that market value." (Sacramento etc. R. R. 
Co. v. He11bron, 156 Cal. 408, 412 [104 P. 979].) [aa] "In 
ascertaining the market value of real property any evidence 
which tends to show the physical condition of the property, 
the purpose for which it is employed, or any reasonable use 
for which it may be adapted, is competent." (City of Los 
Angeles v. Cole, 28 Cal.2d 509, 518 [170 P.2d 928], quoting 
with approval from City of Beverly Hills v. Anger, 127 Cal. 
App. 223, 228 [15 P.2d 867].) 
[23] But evidence as to what the owner intended to do 
with the land cannot be considered. (People v. Marblehead 
Land Co., 82 Ca1.App. 289, 301 [255 P. 553-]; Los Angeles 
v. Kerckhoff-Cuzner Mill. & Lbr. Co., 15 Cal.App. 676, 677 
[115 P. 654].) For there can be no allowance for enhanced 
camage which an owner "would suffer by reason of being 
prevented from carrying out a particlilar scheme of improve-
ment, existing only in contemplation at the time of the trial." 
(Los Angeles v. Kerckhof/-Cuzner MilZ. cf Lbr. Co., ""pra, 
at p. 688.) [a4] However, under certain circumstances, 
evidence that a proposed use wolild result in a profit is ad-
missible, "not for the purpose of enhancing the damages by 
showing the loss to the owner of a particular plan of opera-
tion, but to show that such proposed plan is a feasible plan 
and should be considered in :fixing market value." (City of 
Daly City v. Smith, 110 Cal.App.2d 524, 532 [243 P.2d 46] ; 
and see United States v. 25.406 Acres of Land, supra, at 
p.994.) 
Here, a portion of the testimony complained of was ad-




752 PEOPLE 11. LA MACCHIA [41 C.2d 
it was offered as a description of the uses to which the prop· 
erties were adaptable. But the majority of it comes squarely 
within the rule which prohibits the admission of evidence 
concerning an owner's purposes with regard to his property. 
[25] However, to a considerable extent, any prejudice re-
sulting from the erroneous admission of the evidence was 
offset by other testimony similar in character which was re-
ceived without objection. (See Mullanix v.Basich. 67 Cal. 
App.2d 675. 679 [155 P.2d 130].) For example. Challen testi-
fied :"1 happen to know that the owner [of parcel 4] has put 
in a very diversified orchard in there, in order to sell his com-
modities on the highway, which proves the fact that that 
property does have commercial value; and ... [the other 
landowners] ... bought their property [for the same 
reason]." 
[26] In this connection, the jury was instructed: "What-
ever the purpose the Defendants had in connection with the 
future use' of the property. can add nothing to its market 
value. The fact that this purpose is defeated by condemna-
tion. however much a disappointment. is not a matter of 
compensation, A use existing or contemplated on property 
is distinct from the market value of the property itself and 
ill not the conclusive basis for fixing such market value, 
and is not to be considered as determining the value of the 
land. Value in use. is not to be considered by you as de-
termining the market value of the property. A plan which 
Defendants mayor may not have had for the improvement 
of the property adds nothing to the market value. The fact 
that a plan for the improvement. if any. was affected by 
condemnation. however much a disappointment. is not a mat-
ter of compensation." It must be assumed that the jury 
understood such clear and unambiguous language and cor-
rectly applied the instructions to the evidence. (Nunneley 
v. Edgar Hotel. 36 Cal.2d 493. 500 [225 P.2d 497] ; Henderson 
v. Los Angeles Traction 00., 150 Cal. 689. 697 [89 P. 976].) 
[27] Next. t.he state attacks the instructions concerning 
the existing right of access to the highway in which the iilry 
was told that the owner of abuttin/r land has a private right 
in such highway distinct from that of the public for the pur-
pose of access to and egress from his land. This right. the 
instruction stated, cannot be taken from the landowner with-
out just compensation. The state complains of the trial judge's 
failure to add that the right of a~cess is limited to that which 
is reasonable for the purposes to which the property is 
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adapted. Instead, it is argued, the instruction informs the jury 
that the right of access is an unqualified and unlimited one 
and not subordinate to normal highway uses. 
On this subject the state requested and the court refused 
an instruction stating that an abutting owner has no right to 
insist upon the construction of a road in such a manner that 
he may travel directly from the highway to any portion of 
his adjoining land. The jurors might well have been told 
that" [t]he extent of the easement of access may be said 
to be that which is reasonably required giving consideration 
to all the purposes to which the property is adapted" (Bacieh 
v. Board of Oontrol, 23 Ca1.2d 343, 352 [144 P.2d 818]). 
But they were instructed that only when the condemnation 
destroys or substantially impairs the right of access is an 
owner entitled to compensation therefor. Considering the 
instructions as a whole, they fairly state the controlling 
principles. 
[28] The state also complains of the charge to the jury in 
which it was said: "Owners are presumed to know the value of 
their property, and being permitted under the law to testify 
thereto, their evidence in that regard is et1titled to be weighed 
and considered by the jury." This instruction, as read by 
the state, informs the jury that the testimony of an owner 
is entitled to greater weight than that of other witnesses 
on value. Although the word "presumed" should not have 
been used, it is significant that the awards are far below the 
value placed by the owners upon their respective properties. 
Moreover, the record shows instructions which state that the 
final responsibility for determining the amounts to be awarded 
rests with the jurors, and it is their duty to evaluate and 
weigh the testimony of witnesses who stated their opinions 
as to values. 
Next, the state maintains that it was error to instruct the 
jury "if possible, to reconcile the conflicting testimony and 
to give it all due weight." The state argues that in view of 
the wide discrepancy in the estimates of vahie and damage by 
witnesses for the respective sides, it is clear that the opinions 
were irreconcilably conflicting, and the effect of the instruction 
was to tell the jury to "cut somewhere in between" divergent 
amounts. [29] However, "Upon the trier of fact rests the 
responsibility to reconcile, if possible, any apparent conflict, 
whether the same arises upon the entire case or in the testi-
mony of a single witness, and to effectuate all the evidence, 
when the nature of the case will admit of such a disposition." 
) 
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(Darling v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 197 Cal. 702, 708 [242 P. 
703] ; Boens v. Bennett, 20 Cal.App.2d 477, 483 [67 P.2d 715].) 
Finally, the state contends, the jury was erroneously ad-
vised that, in ascertaining market value, the purpose for 
which the property was being taken by the state could be 
considered. [30] Compensation is based on loss imposed 
on the owner, rather than on benefit received by the taker. 
(Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 
[30 S.Ct. 459, 54 L.Ed. 725]; Orgel on Valuation Under 
Eminent Domain, § 79, p. 257.) The beneficial purpose to 
be derived by the condemnor's use of the property is not to 
be taken into consideration in determining market values, 
for it is wholy irrelevant. (City of Stockton v. Vote, 76 Cal. 
App. 369, 400 [244 P. 609].) [31] But the jury in the 
present case also was told: "Although the market value of the 
property is to be determined with due consideration of all its 
available uses, its special value to the State as distinguished 
from others who mayor may not possess the power to con-
demn, must be excluded as an element of market value." 
In view of that concise statement of the law, the erroneous 
language in the other instruction could not have influenced 
the awards. Furthermore, and most significant, there is no 
evidence in regard to the value of the use to the state for 
highway purposes, and the jury received the usual instruction 
to award compensation "in accordance with the evidence in 
this case." 
Although some of the rulings and instructions were errone-
ous, it cannot reasonably be said that, upon examination of 
the entire record, there has been a miscarriage of justice 
requiring reversal of the judgment. (Cal. Const., art. VI, 
§ 41h.) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-l concur in 
the judgment. Nevertheless I must protest the obsolescent 
rule, reaffirmed by the majority, that the value of real prop-
erty cannot be proved by evidence of sales of comparable rea] 
pr~perty. Only a few courts follow it, and their number 
diminishes. The most recent to abandon the rule are the 
Court of Appeals of New York and the Supreme Court of 
Nebraska. (Village of Lawrence v. Greenwood, 300 N.Y. 231 
[90 N.E.2d 53, 56J; Langdon v. lhup River Public Power 
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Did., 142 Neb. 859 [8 N.W.2d 201, 206].) It has withered 
under the devast8(ting attacks on it. (See Wigmore, Evi-
dence [3d ed.], § 463, p. 503 et seq.; 174 A.L.R. 386; 118 
A.L.R. 870; 32 C.J.S., Evidence, p. 444 et seq.; City of Los 
Angeles v. Cole, 28 Ca1.2d 509, 517 [170 P.2d 928] [dissent]; 
Heimann v. City of Los Angeles, 30 Ca1.2d 746, 760 [185 
P.2d 597] [dissent].) Why bolster it when it is doomed T 
Admittedly such evidence, which everyone uses to deter-
mine value, is relevant; so relevant that it is hardly credible 
that it would be excluded. It is conceded that on cross-exam-
ination a witness may be questioned as to his knowledge of 
sales of comparable property. (City of Los Angeles v. Cole, 
supra, 28 Ca1.2d 509, 518.) On redirect examination he may 
be questioned regarding such sales in relation to the ,aluation 
that he gave on direct examination. (See majority opinion 
herein disapproving Atchison, T. ~ S. F. R. Co. v. Souther'll 
Pac. Co., 13 Cal.App.2d 505 [57 P.2d 575].) Why is there 
no concern about collateral issues on cross or redirect examin-
ation and concern of phantom proportions on direct examin-
ation 7 The magnified risk of collateral issues must be bal-
anced against the reality of inevitable confusion when jurors 
hear evidence of the greatest relevance and are then told 
that they cannot base the value of the property on that evi-
dence. 
The trial court has ample power to keep the trial under 
control. As the New York Court of Appeals noted in its 
opinion overruling earlier cases, "Instances .there may be 
where proof of sales of comparable property may prompt a 
line of inquiry which will develop collateral issues likely to 
confuse the fact-finders and prolong the trial. We regard 
such disadvantages, however, as more than compensated by 
the benefit to be gained by the receipt of such evidence subject 
to the exercise, by the tribunal which fixes value, of its dis-
cretionary power to draw the line of exclusion wherever con-
fusion is caused by collateral issues." (ViUage of Lawrence 
v. Greenwood, supra, 90 N.E.2d 53, 56.) 
In the present case the owner testified, not to an actual sale 
of comparable real property, but to an unaccepted offer to 
buy the property in question. Most courts that admit evidence 
of sales of comparable property hold that evidence of an 
unaccepted offer is not of sufficient probative value to justify 
admission. (See 7 A.L.R.2d 781.) Other courts, however, 
admit such evidence, if the offer is shown to be bona fide and 
a sufficient foundation is laid. (Chicago v. Lehmann, 262 
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Ill. 468, 474 [104 N.E. 829]; Tharp v. Massengl1l, 38 N.M. 
58,62 [28 P.2d 502, 94 A.L.R. 726] ; see Union Nat. Bank v. 
Crump, 349 Pa. 339, 343 (37 A.2d 733].) It is my opinion 
that when, as here, the offer is bona fide and is for the identical 
property, and is by a purchaser able and willing to buy, evi-
dence of the offer should be admitted. Accordingly, the trial 
judge ruled correctly that the witness could mention the offer 
for his property in giving the reasons for his valuation. (See 
Long Beach City H.S. Dist. v. Stewart, 30 Cal.2d 763, 773 
[185 P.2d 585,173 A.L.R. 249].) 
Carter, J., and Schauer, concurred. 
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